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Despite reforms over the past quarter-century, world agricultural markets remain highly distorted 
by government policies. Traditional indicators of those price distortions such as the nominal rate 
of assistance and consumer tax equivalent provide measures of the degree of intervention, but 
they can be misleading as indicators of the true effects of those policies. By drawing on recent 
theoretical literature that provides indicators of the trade- and welfare-reducing effects of price 
and trade policies, this paper develops more-satisfactory indexes for capturing distortions to 
agricultural incentives. It then exploits the Agricultural Distortion database recently compiled by 
the World Bank to generate estimates of them for both developing and high-income countries 
over the past half century, based on a sample of 75 countries that together account for all but 
one-tenth of the world’s population, GDP and agricultural production. While they are still only 
partial equilibrium measures, they provide a much better approximation of the true trade and 
welfare effects of sectoral policies without needing a formal model of global markets or even 
price elasticity estimates.  
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  While those various indicators of dispersion are useful, it would also be helpful to 
have a single indicator to capture the overall welfare or trade effect of each country’s regime 
of agricultural price distortions in place at any time. To that end, a theoretical literature has 
developed in recent years. This literature seeks to overcome aggregation problems across 
different intervention measures and across the product range by using a theoretically sound 
aggregation procedure that answers precise questions regarding the welfare and trade 




The methodology outlined in Anderson et al. (2008) provides a number of ways to indicate 
the extent of distortions within the agricultural sector of a country (as distinct from between 
agriculture and other sectors, for which the relative rate of assistance indicator is used). They 
include the unweighted or weighted mean NRA of covered products, the standard deviation 
of covered product NRAs, the weighted mean NRA for exportable versus import-competing 
covered products, and the trade bias index defined as [(1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 
1] where NRAagx and NRAagm are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the exportable 
and import-competing parts, respectively, of the agricultural sectors’ covered plus non-
covered products. The reason for reporting the latter indicators of dispersion in addition to the 
means – apart from them being informative in their own right – is that theory suggests the 
national economic welfare cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of 
resource misallocation tends to be greater the greater the degree of substitution in production 
(Lloyd 1974). In the case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-
specific but very transferable among farm activities, the greater the variation of NRAs across 
industries within the sector then the higher will be the welfare cost of those market 
interventions. 
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful for the NRA estimates provided by country authors and for invaluable help with data 
compilation and manipulation by Esteban Jara, Marianne Kurzweil, Signe Nelgen and Ernesto Valenzuela. This 
chapter draws heavily on Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009).   2 
considerably over the past two decades, particularly with the theoretical advances by 
Anderson and Neary (summarized in and extended beyond their 2005 book) and the 
theoretical simplifications by Feenstra (1995).  
Notwithstanding these advances, few series of consistently estimated indexes have yet 
been estimated across time and even fewer across countries. A prominent exception is the 
work of Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008, 2009), who estimate a series for developing and 
high-income countries, but they provide estimates only for a snapshot in time (the early-
2000s). Other studies that have been country specific include an application to Mexican 
agriculture in the late 1980s (Anderson and Bannister 1992) and a long time series for US 
trade policy (Irwin 2009). 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide estimates of indexes that are comparable 
across the focus countries and over the time period of the present study of global distortions 
to agricultural incentives. The estimates presented below make a significant contribution to 
the empirical literature on welfare and trade reduction indexes, as they provide the first panel 
set of consistent indexes for the agricultural sector for both developing and high-income 
countries. It is a global panel dataset that contains comparable estimates of annual nominal 
rates of assistance (NRAs) and consumer tax equivalents (CTEs)
2 for a wide range of 
agricultural products (around a dozen per country) over the past half century for 75 countries 
that together account for all but one-tenth of the world’s population and agricultural 
production and 95 percent of global GDP.
3
The indexes we estimate are well grounded in theory: they belong to the family of 
indexes first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005) under the catch-all name of trade 
restrictiveness indexes. To date, members of that family of indexes sometimes have been 
distinguished by using various adjectives; but at the same time others have used the trade 
restrictiveness index term for measures that have a different theoretical backing (for example 
the one used by the IMF – see Allen 2005). To avoid confusion, we coin terms that are more 
precise descriptors. Specifically, to capture distortions imposed by each country’s border and 
  
                                                 
2 The NRA and CTE measures are related to the well-known producer and consumer subsidy equivalent (PSE 
and CSE) measures estimated by the OECD (2008). Their main conceptual difference is that the NRA and CTE 
are expressed as a percentage of the undistorted price, whereas the PSE and CSE are expressed as a percentage 
of the distorted price. The NRA and CTE values are identical if the only government interventions are at a 
country’s border (such as a tariff on imports). In the case of agriculture, however, there are typically domestic 
production or consumption taxes or subsidies also in place, so the NRAs and CTEs differ. 
3 Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). Within each region the shares of agricultural value added that the studied 
countries represented in 1990-2004 at distorted prices are 90 percent for high-income countries, 92 percent for 
Europe’s transition economies (including Turkey and Central Asia), and 86 percent of developing countries (76 
percent in Africa, 94 percent in Asia, 81 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 0 percent in the 
Middle East), hence 88 percent globally.   3 
domestic policies on its economic welfare and its trade volume, we define measures we call 
the Trade Reduction Index (TRI) and the Welfare Reduction Index (WRI). The WRI is 
computed from sub-indexes which we call the Producer Distortion Index (PDI) and the 
Consumer Distortion Index (CDI). The PDI and CDI are needed if any product’s NRA and 
CTE differ, that is, whenever there are domestic subsidies or taxes on production or 
consumption in addition to border measures – as so often there are for staple foods and other 
farm products.  
Thus the indexes we estimate capture the welfare and trade reducing effects of all 
policies directly affecting consumer and producer prices of farm products from all 
agricultural and food policy measures in place.
4
The TRI (or WRI) has the advantage of providing a theoretically sound partial 
equilibrium indicator of the trade (or welfare) effect in a single sectoral measure that is 
comparable across time and place. In this way the TRI and WRI go somewhat closer to 
what a computable general equilibrium (CGE) can provide in the way of estimates of the 
trade and welfare (and other) effects of the price distortions captured by the product NRA 
and CTE estimates – and have the advantage of being able to indicate trends over time, 
 On the production side, by calculating the 
percentages by which domestic prices exceed border prices, the NRA estimates include 
assistance provided by all tariff and non-tariff trade measures, plus any domestic price 
support measures, plus an adjustment for the output-price equivalent of direct interventions 
on farm inputs. Where multiple exchange rates operate, an estimate of the import or export 
tax equivalents of that distortion are included as well (see Anderson et al. 2008a,b or 
Appendix A). On the consumption side, CTE measures — also expressed as ad valorem 
rates — estimate the extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized by various 
agricultural, social welfare, trade and exchange rate policy measures. Like NRAs, the range 
of measures included in the CTE estimates is wide, including both domestic consumer and 
border taxes/subsidies/quantitative measures, so as to fully capture the wedge between the 
price that consumers pay for each commodity and the international price at the border 
adjusted to account for marketing margins, quality differences and the like.  
                                                 
4 Throughout this chapter we ignore indirect effects of sectoral and trade policy measures directed at non-
agricultural sectors. We also adopt the standard assumptions in basic trade theory that there are no divergences 
between private and social marginal costs and benefits that might arise from externalities, market failures, and 
any other behind-the-border policies not represented in our analysis, including such things as underinvestment in 
public goods.    4 
which a comparative static CGE model can do only if it is calibrated to a series of past 
years rather than to just one particular year.
5
The TRI (or WRI) is defined as the ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied 
uniformly across all tradable agricultural commodities in a country would generate the 
same reduction in trade (or economic welfare loss) as the actual cross-product structure of 





The WRI measure reflects better than the NRA or CTE the true partial equilibrium 
welfare cost of agricultural price-distorting policies because it is a mean of order two. In 
particular, it captures the disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak levels of 
assistance or taxation. Also, the WRI and TRI measures overcome aggregation problems 
when there are different NRAs for sub-sectors within agriculture. For example, if policies 
affecting the import-competing and exporting sub-sectors had offsetting effects on farmer 
incentives, the aggregate NRA estimate may be close to zero even though the welfare- and 
trade-restricting consequences are considerable. Anderson et al. (2008a,b) deal with that by 
estimating separate NRAs and CTEs for each product and then for the import-competing 
and exporting (and nontradables) product sub-groups, and by using those sub-sector means 
to calculate their trade bias index. The WRI and TRI provide more succinct and more 
accurate ways of summarizing that information. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the 
theory for estimating trade and welfare reduction index numbers in the import-competing 
sub-sector. This is extended to cover the exportables sub-sector in the following section. 
The World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions database is then discussed as it is to be used 
here, followed by presentation of the trade and welfare reduction indexes for all countries 
studied in the Agricultural Distortions project. Some concluding observations are presented 
in the final section.  
 
 
Defining the Welfare and Trade Reduction Indexes  
 
                                                 
5 For a set of CGE estimates of the welfare, trade and various other economic effects of the policies captured in 
the Agricultural Distortions database, see Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009).  
6 In addition, another two indexes can be defined as the ad valorem trade tax rate which, if applied uniformly 
across countries for a particular product would generate the same global reduction in trade in that product (or 
global economic welfare loss) as the actual cross-country structure of NRAs and CTEs for that tradable 
commodity. See Anderson et al. (2009).   5 
The initial theoretical work by Anderson and Neary, leading to their 2005 book, sought to 
derive a general equilibrium measure of the welfare-reducing effects of trade restrictions in 
a country’s import-competing sector. They called this a Trade Restrictiveness Index. The 
work was important in that it solved the problem of how to aggregate assistance across 
commodities in a theoretically meaningful way. Anderson and Neary solved the problem 
for a small, open economy in which imports are restricted by tariffs and non-tariff measures 
(NTMs). Anderson and Neary then provided variants of the Trade Restrictiveness Index, 
including one based not on a welfare criterion but instead on an import volume criterion 
(the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index). In what follows, a more-general version of 
each of the Anderson and Neary indexes is developed for situations where, in addition to 
import measures, there are also export measures and possibly also direct domestic producer 
and consumer price distortions.
7
  Consider the market for one good, good i, which is distorted by a combination of 
measures that distort the consumer and producer prices. For the producers of the good, the 
distorted domestic producer price, 
 Our two indexes are first developed for agriculture’s 
import-competing sub-sector and then for its exporting sub-sector. 
 
The import-competing sub-sector 
 
We take a particular country and assume it has a small open economy in which all markets 
are competitive. However, the market for an import good may be distorted by a tariff 
and/or other non-tariff border measures and/or behind-the-border measures such as 
domestic subsidies and price controls.   
  We turn first to the measure of the effect of a country’s distortions on its import 
volume, the TRI. This is defined as the uniform tariff rate which, if applied to all goods in 
the place of all actual tariffs and NTMs and other price distortions, would result in the same 
reduction in the volume of imports as the actual distortions.     
P
i p , is related to the world price, pi
*, by the relation, 
P
i p  
= pi
*(1 + si ) where si is the rate of distortion of the producer price in percentage terms. For 
the consumers of the good, the distorted domestic consumer price, 
C
i p , is related to the 
world price by the relation, 
C
i p   = pi
*(1 + ri ) where ri is the rate of distortion of the 
                                                 
7 We build from Chapter 12 of Anderson and Neary (2005) which is devoted to a consideration of how to deal 
with domestic price distortions.   6 
consumer price in percentage terms. In general, ri ≠ si . Using these relations, the change in 
imports in the market for good i is sum of the areas of two rectangles 
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            (1)
 
where the demand and the supply for good i,  i x and  i y , are functions of own domestic price 
alone:  ()
C
ii i xx p = and  ()
P
ii i yy p = respectively. The neglect of cross-price effects makes the 
analysis partial equilibrium.  
Strictly speaking, this result holds only for small distortions. In reality rates of 
distortion are not small. If, however, we assume that the demand and supply functions are 
linear, the effect on imports is:  
*2 *2 //
CP
i ii i ii i ii M p dx d r p dy d s pp ∆= −            (2) 
              with dx /d t.
C
i i cons p =  and dy /d t.
P
i i cons p =  
 If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss.   
  With n importable goods subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate 
reduction in imports, in the absence of cross-price effects in all markets, is given by:  
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Solving for T, we get 
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The TRI is best regarded as a true index of average distortion rates. More precisely, what is 
held constant is the value of imports in constant prices. R  and S are indices of average 
consumer and producer price distortions. They are arithmetic means. In the empirical 
section of the paper these are referred to as the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) and the 
Consumer Tax Equivalents (CTE).  
Evidently, T can be written as a weighted average of the level of distortions of 
consumer and producer prices. An important advantage of using this decomposition of the 
index into producer and consumer effects is that it treats correctly the effects of NTMs and 
domestic distortions. We can deal with, and analyse, the production and consumption sides of 
the economy separately.
8
* ** * **       () /()
n
i i ii i ii
i
px px u = ρρ ∑
   
In equations (4b) and (4c), the weights for each commodity are proportional to the 
marginal response of domestic production (or consumption) to changes in international free-
trade prices. These weights can be written as functions of the domestic price elasticities of 
supply (demand) and the value of domestic production (consumption) at undistorted prices:  
            (5) 
 
* ** * **    () /()
n
i i ii i ii
i
py py v =−σ σ ∑    
If, further, we assume domestic price elasticities of supply (demand) are equal across 
commodities, the elasticities in the numerator and denominator cancel. Thus we can find R 
(S) by aggregating the change in consumer (producer) prices across commodities, using as 
weights the share of each commodity’s domestic value of consumption (production) at 
undistorted prices. 
Estimating T in equation (4) also requires an assumption about the weights a and b 
(equation (4d)). The weight a (b) is proportional to the ratio of the marginal response of 
domestic demand (supply) to a price change relative to the marginal response of imports to a 
price change. If the domestic demand and supply curves have the same slope, then a=b=0.5. 
  As a special case, if   ri = si  for all i, that is, if tariff rates are the only distortion, 
equation (4) reduces to a much simpler form: 
                                                 
8 MacLaren and Lloyd (2008) analyse the production side of the Australian agricultural sector with a Production 
Distortion Index, PDI (although they use the word Assistance rather than Distortion). This is the uniform 
production subsidy that gives the same deadweight production loss as the actual differentiated structure of 
assistance, and so is exactly equal to the production component we derive above. Here we add a similar uniform 
consumption tax component (call it a Consumption Distortion Index, CDI) and seek a TRI that gives the same 
trade-reducing effect as the sum of the actual trade effects on the two sides of the market. Likewise below we 
generate the WRI that gives the same deadweight welfare loss as the sum of the actual welfare losses on both 
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n
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i
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Here ti is the ad valorem tariff rate, which is equal to the rate of distortion of both consumer 
and producer prices, and  i ε  is the elasticity of import demand. T is the mean of the tariff 
rates. This case can be used to obtain an alternative expression for the general case. But one 
must be careful, as this alternative form requires computing an import-equivalent tariff rate 
for each tariff item when there is some distortion other than an ad valorem tariff. (The 
Appendix derives the import-equivalent tariff and the alternative expression.)  
Now we turn to the measure of the effect of a country’s distortions on its welfare, 
the WRI. The derivation follows the same steps as in the derivation of the TRI. This leads 
to a simple comparison of the two indexes. 
The distortions in the market for good i create a welfare loss,  i L . This loss is given 
by the sum of the change in producer plus consumer surplus net of the tariff revenue. This 
loss of producer and consumer surplus is given simply by the areas of the two triangles 
 
*2 *2 1
2  {( ) dy /d ( ) dx /d }
PC
i i i ii i i ii ps p pr p L =−      (7)    
where the demand and the supply for good i are again functions of own domestic price alone.   
Strictly speaking, this result too holds only for small distortions. With non-small 
rates of distortion, the welfare losses are defined by the triangular-shaped areas under the 
demand and supply curves for the good. These areas can be obtained by integration. On the 
assumption that the demand and supply functions are linear, the welfare loss is again the 
sum of two triangles:  
*2 *2 1
2  {( ) dy /d ( ) dx /d }
PC
i ii i ii i ii ps pr pp L =−           (8) 
    with  dy /d ii p const = . and dx /d t. ii p cons =  
If the functions are not linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss. 
  In the special case where  ri = si = ti, the expression reduces to  
 
*2 1
2  ( ) dx /d i ii i i pt p L = −               (9) 
Equation (9) yields the fundamental result that the loss from a tariff is proportional to the 
square of the tariff rate. This holds because the tariff rate determines both the price 
adjustment and the quantity response to this adjustment.
9
                                                 
9 This insight is usually attributed to Harberger (1959). In fact, it was discovered by Dupuit (1844), more than 
100 years before Harberger, while analysing the welfare loss resulting from commodity taxation. In his words, 
“the loss of utility increases as the square of the tax” (Dupuit 1844, p. 281). Dupuit’s contribution to consumer 
surplus and welfare analysis is considered in Humphrey (1992).  
  If ri ≠ si, as is frequently true in   9 
agricultural markets, the expression in equation (8) yields the result that the consumer and 
the producer losses are each proportional to the square of the rate of distortion of the 
consumer or producer price, respectively.   
  With n importable goods subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate 
welfare loss, in the absence of cross-price effects in all markets, is given by:  
 
PC 1 *2 *2
ii 2
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=− ∑∑         (10) 
The uniform tariff rate that generates an aggregate deadweight loss identical with that of 
the differentiated set of tariffs is determined by the following equation:  
*2 *2 * 2
11 1
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W is the uniform tariff which, if applied to all goods in the place of all actual tariffs and 
NTMs and other distortions, would result in the same aggregate loss of welfare as the 
actual distortions. Solving for W, we have:  
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W is the desired Welfare Reduction Index. R′ and S′are measures of the average levels of 
consumer and producer price distortions, respectively. They are means of order two. In the 
empirical section, R′ and S′are referred to as the Producer Distortion Index (PDI) and the 
Consumer Distortion Index (CDI) to distinguish them from the arithmetic mean forms, the 
NRA and CTE.  
Evidently, W can be written as an appropriately weighted average of the level of 
distortions of consumer and producer prices. It too is a mean of order two. As with the index 
T, we can deal with, and analyse, the production and consumption sides of the economy 
separately.  
Comparing the expression for the WRI in equation (12) with that for the TRI in 
equation (4), we see that the weights in the construction of theR′,S′ and W are the same as   10 
the weights for  R , S  and T.  The only difference in the expressions for R′, S′ and W is 
that, in the case of the TRI, one constructs arithmetic means (which are the means of order 
one) whereas in the case of the WRI one constructs means of order two.
10







 This difference is 
all due to the fact that the losses of import volume in each market are all proportional to the 
distortion rate whereas the losses of welfare are proportional to the squares of the distortions 
rates (compare equation (1) with equation (8)). The tariff rate enters only once in the 
determination of the import loss, in the base of the rectangle, whereas the tariff rate enters 
twice in the determination of the welfare loss, once in the base of the triangle and once in its 
height.  
  In the special case where  ri = si = ti for all i,  equation (12) reduces to a much 
simpler form: 
     
** **       () / ()
n
i i ii i ii
i
w pm pm = εε ∑      (13) 
Further, if we assume that the elasticities of import demand are all equal, the weights are 
the share of imports of each good in total imports. This case can be used to obtain an 
alternative expression of the general case of the WRI. This is done in the Appendix to 
Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009). 
 
Adding the exportables sub-sector 
 
The indexes can each be extended to include the exportables sub-sector. In the exportable 
sector an export subsidy reduces welfare in the same way as an import tax in the import-
competing sector, but it increases trade whereas the tariff reduces trade. It is necessary to 
keep track of import and export price distortions separately, for both producers and 
consumers, for the purpose of estimating the full welfare and trade reduction indexes. In 
essence, this extension is done by extending the commodity set and keeping separate track of 
the subsets of import-competing and exportable goods.  
  As one example, the WRI for the whole tradables sector can be written as an 
expansion of equation (12):  
2 2 2 2 1/2 {( ) ( ) } M PM X PX M CM X CX W R R aS S b ′′ ′′ = ω+ω + ω+ω                              (14a) 
                                                 
10 Anderson and Neary (2005, p.21) note that the expressions for their measures of trade restriction and welfare 
reduction use the same weights.   11 




























































1 ω               (14b) 
 
It can be seen that when including both import-competing and exportable sub-sectors, we 
continue to first aggregate for producers and consumers separately, where the weights for 
each sub-sector are the share of the sub-sectors’ value of production (consumption) in the 
total value of production (consumption). Producer and consumer distortions are aggregated 
in the last step with the usual assumption that the aggregate demand and supply curves 
have the same slope (that is, a = b = 0.5). The resulting measure can be regarded as the 
import tax/export subsidy which, if applied uniformly, would give the same loss of welfare 
as the combinations of measures distorting consumer and producer prices in the import-
competing and exportable sub-sectors.  
  The TRI can be similarly decomposed as follows:  
b S S a R R T CX X CM M PX X PM M ) ( ) ( ω ω ω ω + + + =                                     (15) 

















= − ∑ .                            (16) 
The aggregates in equation (16) are the weighted average levels of distortions to consumer 
and producer prices in the exportables sub-sector, respectively, with weights  i u  and  i v  given 
in equation (4b and c). Importantly, distortions to the exportables sub-sector enter equation 
(16) as negative values. This is because whilst a lowering of ri (the distortion of the consumer 
price of good i) or si (the distortion of the producer price of good i) in the import-competing 
sub-sector reduces the reduction index, a lowering of ri or si in the exportables sub-sector 
increases it.  
  These extensions of the TRI and the WRI have precisely the same properties as the 
indices for the import-competing sector.   
 
 
The World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions Project Database 
   12 
 
The database generated by the World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions project (Anderson 
and Valenzuela 2008) contains around 30,000 consistent estimates of annual nominal rates 
of assistance (NRAs) to the agricultural sector and the same number of consumer tax 
equivalents (CTEs) for a total of 75 countries over a time period between 1955 and 2007. 
The country coverage in the 1950s is much less than from 1960 though, so we begin our 
series of index estimates in that year; and NRA and CTE estimates are available for 2005-
07 only for high-income and European transition economies (tables 1 and 2). The series 
contains data at the commodity level, for a sub-set of agricultural products (called covered 
products) that account for around 70 percent of total agricultural production of each studied 
country. Aggregate NRAs and CTEs for various sectors and sub-sectors (including import-
competing and exporting sub-sectors) are estimated, using as weights the values of 
production and consumption, respectively, at undistorted prices.
11
  The most aggregated summaries of NRA and CTE estimates for covered products 
for developing and high income countries are provided in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 supports 
the widely held views that developing country governments had in place agricultural 
policies that effectively taxed their farmers through to the 1980s, and that the extent of 
those disincentives has lessened since then. The extent of taxation was of the order of 15+ 
percent from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s. Since then it has not only diminished but, 
on average, has become slightly positive. Figure 1 also supports the view that the growth of 
agricultural protection in high-income countries has been going on since the 1950s, and 
began to reverse only after the 1980s (at which time there was a re-instrumentation toward 
  
  The range of policy measures included in the Agricultural Distortions database 
NRA estimates is wide. By calculating domestic-to-border price ratios the estimates 
include assistance provided by all tariff and non-tariff trade measures, plus any domestic 
price support measures (positive or negative), plus an adjustment for the output-price 
equivalent of direct interventions on inputs. Where multiple exchange rates operate, an 
estimate of the import or export tax equivalents of that distortion are included as well. The 
range of measures included in the CTE estimates include both domestic consumer 
taxes/subsidies plus trade and exchange rate policies, all of which drive a wedge between 
the price that consumers pay for each commodity and the international price at the border.  
                                                 
11 Estimates of the NRA for total agricultural production in studied countries are obtained by making 
‘guesstimates’ of the rates of assistance for the remaining 30 percent of agricultural production. Those 
guesstimates are not used in the present study, but their impact can be seen by comparing the third and fourth 
sets of rows of NRAs in Table1.   13 
forms of support – not included here – that are somewhat decoupled from production). It is 
clear from figure 2 that consumers have experienced changes similar to producers in recent 
years. In developing countries, taxation was negative (i.e. consumer subsidization was 
positive) for most of the last 50 years, but this has lessened since the 1990s. In high-income 
countries, the implicit taxation of consumers from agricultural support rose until the early 
1990s but has fallen since then.   
  Figures 3 and 4 show the trends in NRAs and CTEs, respectively, for Europe’s 
transition economies and the three developing country regions of Africa, Asia, Latin 
America. On the production side, Africa is where there has been least tendency to reduce the 
taxing of farmers and subsidizing of consumers of covered farm products. Indeed its average 
NRA has been negative in all 5-year periods except in the mid-1980s when international 
prices of farm products reached an all-time low in real terms. By contrast, for both Asia and 
Latin America their NRAs crossed over from negative to positive after the 1980s. And in 
Europe’s transition economies, the nominal assistance to farmers has trended upward 
following their initial shock in the early 1990s. For consumers in all four regions, agricultural 
policies have almost always involved consumer subsidization. Since the 1980s, however, 
food consumer subsidization in Asia, Latin America and Europe’s transition economies has 
gradually disappeared and been replaced by a small degree of taxation.    
Within the farm sector of all regions, the assistance to the import-competing sub-
sector is typically well above that for the export sector (Lloyd, Croser and Anderson 2008, 
Appendix Tables A.1 to A.4), meaning there is an anti-trade bias in the structure of 
distortions. In the case of developing countries where the former NRA is positive and the 
latter negative, the two tend to offset each other such that the overall sectoral NRA is close to 
zero. Such a sectoral average can thus be misleading as an indication of the aggregate extent 
of price distortion within the sector. It can also be misleading when compared across 
countries that have varying degrees of dispersion in their NRAs for different farm products 
(see Anderson et al. 2009). 
 
 
Measuring the Welfare and Trade Reduction Indexes  
 
 
Table 3 reports the WRIs for agricultural import-competing products, exportables, and all 
covered tradable products from 1960 to 2007 for the five main studied regions and for the   14 
world as a whole.
12
    A third point to note is that the WRI and its two components (PDI and CDI, 
reported in tables 5 nd 6) — unlike the arithmetic mean measures of assistance, the NRA 
and CTE —reflect the true welfare cost of agricultural policies when they have offsetting 
components. This can be seen most clearly for the case of Africa where, in the latter half of 
1980s, it was still taxing exportables but had moved (temporarily) from low to very high 
 The WRI results for covered products show a similar pattern over the five 
regions: there is constant or increasing tendency for policies to reduce welfare from the 1960s 
to the mid-1980s, but thereafter the opposite occurs in almost all regions, as can be seen from 
figure 5. This pattern is generated by different policy regimes in different regions. In high-
income countries, agriculture was assisted throughout the period, although it peaked in the 
1980s (at around 60 percent) and thereafter fell. By contrast, in developing countries, 
agriculture was disprotected until the mid-1980s, and only thereafter did taxation of 
developing country farmers decline to the point that they received positive assistance by the 
turn of the century. The first point to note, then, is that the WRI has the desirable property of 
correctly reflecting the welfare consequences that result from both positive and negative 
assistance regimes for the sector.  
  A second point to note is that the WRI provides a better indicator of the welfare 
cost of distortions than the average level of assistance or taxation in the Agricultural 
Distortions database (NRA and CTE). Although the latter are a significant contribution in 
their own right (for example, as inputs into global commodity or economy-wide models), 
they can be misleading as a pair of indicators of the extent of the welfare costs of 
assistance. This is due to the inclusion in the WRI of the ‘power of two’. That is, a 
weighted arithmetic mean does not fully reflect the welfare effects of agricultural 
distortions because the dispersion of that support or taxation across products has been 
ignored. By contrast, the WRI captures the higher welfare costs of high and peak levels of 
assistance or taxation. A good example of this is the WRI for high-income countries. In 
figure 1, the NRA series for high-income countries is everywhere positive, but in figure 5 
the WRI series is higher than the NRA series, owing to its capturing of the dispersion of the 
NRA. That is, the WRI reflects the so-called ‘disparity’ issue discussed in Lloyd (2007): 
the larger the variance in assistance levels, the greater the potential for resources to be used 
in activities which do not maximize economic welfare.  
                                                 
12 National WRIs are aggregated across countries using as weights an average of the value of consumption and 
production at undistorted prices. National TRIs are aggregated across countries using the absolute difference 
between the value of production and the value of consumption at undistorted prices. National and regional WRIs 
and TRIs for the 5-year periods are unweighted averages of the annual indexes.   15 
positive levels of protection for import-competing farm products (table 1). Figure 3 
indicates that in 1985-89 the weighted average NRA for African import-competing and 
exporting farmers was close to zero. However, figure 5 shows that the WRI for Africa 
peaks in this time period. Thus, while at the aggregate level African farmers received 
almost no government assistance then, the welfare cost of the mixture of agricultural 
programs as a whole was at its highest.  
  For developing countries as a group, the trade restrictiveness of agricultural policy 
was roughly constant until the early 1990s and thereafter it declined, especially for Asia 
and Latin America, according to the TRI estimates for the five main regions and for 
different sub-sectors (figure 6 and table 4). For high-income countries the TRI time path 
was similar but the decline began a few years later. The aggregate results for developing 
countries are being driven by the exportables sub-sector which is being taxed and the 
import-competing sub-sector which is being protected (albeit by less than in high-income 
countries – see tables 1 and 4). For high-income countries, policies support both exporting 
and import-competing agricultural products and, even though they favour the latter much 
more heavily (figure 1), the assistance to exporters offsets somewhat the anti-trade bias 
from the protection of import-competing producers in terms of their impacts on those 
countries’ aggregate volume of trade in farm products. This is reflected in much smaller 
TRI for high-income countries in the third as compared with the first row for high-income 
countries in table 4.  
  Like the WRI, the TRI correctly aggregates the restrictiveness of sub-sector policies 
that are masked in aggregate NRA and CTE measures, because they offset one another. 
Using again the example of Africa in 1985-89 when the NRA was closest to zero, the TRI 
peaks at this time in a way that correctly identifies the trade-reducing effect of positive 
protection to the import-competing sub-sector and disprotection to the exportables sub-
sector. 
  The TRI generally shows greater variance than the WRI series. This is because the 
TRI measure is sensitive to switches from negative to positive rates of assistance. For 
example, a move from -30 to +30 percent rates of assistance would have little or no effect 
on the partial equilibrium welfare consequences of the policy, but it could have a 
significant effect on trade restrictiveness: net imports of farm products would be greater 
when the NRA is negative than when it is positive, ceteris paribus. The greater variability 
of the TRI is most clearly demonstrated for Asia in the period from 1965-69 to 1985-89:   16 
the WRI measure barely changed throughout that period whereas the TRI dipped down and 
then spiked upwards in the 1980s (c.f. figures 5 and 6).  
For completeness, we also include the PDI and CDI estimates (tables 5 and 6) and the 
national WRI and TRI estimates (tables 7 and 8). The PDI and CDI estimates are not 
identical, but their similarity reflects the fact that most of the distortions to agricultural 
incentives, as compiled in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), are due to price distortions at 
national borders with domestic measures contributing relatively little. Even so, it is important 
to keep the PDI and CDI separate because they can be very different for some products. 
Likewise, the country detail in tables 7 and 8 reveals considerable differences within each 
region that are concealed in the regional aggregates reported in earlier tables and figures. 
Those differences are illustrated clearly for 2000-04 in figure 7, where individual country 
TRIs and WRIs are shown. That figure reveals the extremely high indexes for the most 
agricultural-protecting countries in the world, namely the three European Free Trade Area 
members (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) and the three advanced economies of Northeast 
Asia (Japan, Korea and Taiwan). Notice also from Figure 7 that while the WRI is always 
positive, the TRI can be negative – and is slightly for a few countries, because of export or 
import subsidies. 
A useful way of summarizing the regional estimates is provided in figure 8, which 
shows their movement since most of the indexes peaked in the late 1980s. The indexes would 
suggest agricultural policies were not reducing either trade or welfare of a region if the region 
were located at the zero point of both axes, that is, in the bottom left corner of the diagram 
(the ‘sweet spot’). While almost no region is near that point, virtually all regions have moved 
towards it since 1985-89, and very substantially so for the outliers, namely Africa and 
EFTA+Japan but considerably also for the largest developing country region (Asia) and the 
European Union. 
The biggest contributors to the global reduction in trade from farm policies are (in 
order) Japan, Korea, India, France and Germany, while the biggest contributors to the global 
reduction in welfare from farm policies are (again in order) Japan, the United States, Korea, 
China and France (figure 9).  
Over the entire period since 1961, the WRI has tended to be higher the higher is a 
country’s real GDP per capita (figure 10). We also found a negative correlation between the 
TRI and a trade specialisation index defined as the ratio of net exports to the total value of 
exports plus imports of agriculture and food – and an even stronger negative correlation 
between the WRI and that trade specialisation index. That is, agricultural-exporting countries   17 
tend to have both lower measures of the TRI and WRI, while import-competing countries 
tend to have more welfare- and trade-reducing policies in place. 
What can be said about agricultural distortions in the world as a whole? The fact that 
NRAs for high-income and developing countries diverged (in opposite ways) away from zero 
in the first half of the period under study, and then converged toward zero in the most recent 
quarter-century, meant that their weighted average NRA traced out a fairly flat trend. By 
contrast, figure 11 shows the WRI and TRI for the world as a whole each tracing out a hill-
shaped path and thus providing less misleading indicators of the evolving disarray in world 
agricultural markets. Figure 11 also suggests that the global welfare cost of distortions was 
much higher than the NRA indicates but more so in earlier decades than in the current one, 
whereas the trade restrictiveness of farm policies globally was less than the NRA implied at 
the beginning and end of the period studied but was much more than the global average NRA 
implied in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Finally, how do our estimates of these partial equilibrium indicators of trade and 
welfare reduction compare with those generated by a global general equilibrium model? Even 
though there are numerous reasons for not expecting them to be the same, such a comparison 
can be a check on the orders of magnitude at least. Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and 
Anderson (2009) provides one such set of modeling results. It uses the economy wide 
Linkage Model and the present project’s NRAs and CTEs to examine what the trade, welfare 
and other effects would be of removing all distortions to goods markets globally as of 2004. 
According to that model, global trade in all primary and lightly processed agricultural 
products would be $154 billion higher, and global welfare would be $168 billion higher, or 
$101 billion if just agricultural and food policies were liberalized (Valenzuela, van der 
Mensbrugghe and Anderson 2009, tables 13.14 and 13.16). This compares with the global 
TRI and WRI of $138 billion and $282 billion for 2000-04 for just our 75 focus countries and 
for just farm products. The welfare result from the Linkage Model is smaller than the WRI 
number – despite the model’s broader coverage of products and countries – because it takes 
into account the general equilibrium effects of other (including non-agricultural) distortions 
at home and also distortions abroad insofar as they affect international prices, whereas the 
global WRI is obtained simply by summing the WRIs of each country. A better comparison 
would have been with a set of model scenarios where just farm policies were liberalized in 
just one of the 75 countries at a time, but that would require 75 simulations and remains an 
area for further research. 





This chapter provides a panel set of index estimates that is well-grounded in trade theory 
and that takes into account the various forms of agricultural price and trade taxes/subsidies. 
The panel set covers 75 countries over the past half-century. It provides a very useful 
supplement to the various indicators of the mean and variance of aggregate NRAs and 
CTEs and the trade bias index used in previous chapters, especially from the viewpoint of 
the likely economic welfare or trade impacts of a country’s structure of assistance 
to/taxation of agricultural industries and food consumers. These indexes can thus serve as 
inputs into cross-county studies of the impact over time of agricultural distortions on 
growth, poverty, unemployment and so forth. They also are important supplements to the 
NRA and CTE in improving our understanding of the long history of food and agricultural 
price and trade policies. That is especially true in seeking an index of global distortions 
when developing and high-income countries’ NRAs or CTEs tend to offset each other. Our 
new indexes suggest the world was not very much less distorted by 2004 than it was in the 
1960 (although it certainly was compared with the latter 1980s), and that the level of 
distortion is far higher than that suggested by the global average NRA or CTE. 
  There would be high returns to further research in this area. The above estimates are 
based on the assumption that the domestic price elasticities of supply (demand) are equal 
across commodities within a country. They could thus be refined by relaxing the 
assumption. This would entail a move to ‘marginal welfare weights’, instead of production 
and consumption share weights when estimating the PDI and CDI, respectively. Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) provide a methodology for estimating elasticities that could be 
adapted to the Agricultural Distortions project database.  
Finally, the above equations can also be developed so that estimates of the 
distortions of consumer and producer prices for a particular commodity in individual 
countries can be aggregated across countries to obtain partial equilibrium indexes of the 
reduction in world trade and economic welfare for any chosen global commodity market. 
The first attempt to do that is presented in the next chapter (Anderson et al. 2009). 
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Appendix: Alternative expressions for the TRI and the WRI using Import-equivalent 
and Welfare-equivalent Tariff Rates 
 
This Appendix derives alternative expressions for the TRI and the WRI which are simpler 
and can be related to other measures in the existing literature. First, we require the concepts 
of the import-equivalent tariff rate and the welfare-equivalent tariff rate.  
When the market is distorted by a measure or measures other than a tariff, the usual 
practice is to take the producer price distortion as the equivalent rate (for example, Kee, 
Nicita and Olarreaga 2008, 2009). We can call this rate the producer-price equivalent rate. 
But this procedure is not, in general, correct because this producer-price equivalent rate 
does not replicate the effect on trade or welfare of the measure(s). The computation of the 
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Import-equivalent tariff rates 
 
The import-equivalent tariff rate is the tariff rate that results in the same restriction of imports 
as the combination of measures applied to good i.  
When the market is distorted by a combination of measures that distort the consumer 
and producer prices differentially, the change in imports is (from equation (2) above) 
                        (A.1) 
The import-equivalent tariff is defined by the equality 
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13 One must be careful in calculating these rates. In some cases, the effects of two (or more) measures on the 
distortions of producer and consumer prices are not additive. For example, suppose that the producers are 
assisted by a 10 per cent tariff and a quota that, if applied alone, would raise producer and consumer prices by 
20 per cent. The combined effect of these two measures on producer and consumer prices is only 20 per cent. In 
other cases, one or a combination of measures may prohibit trade. In such a case, the relevant rate is the 
prohibitive tariff rate.   22 
In general, ri ≠ si . The import-equivalent tariff rate is a weighted arithmetic mean of the rates 
of distortion of consumer and producer prices, the weights being their share of the import 
response to the change in price. If  0 i r >  and 0 i s >   then  0
I
i t > .  
   
Welfare-equivalent tariff rates 
 
The welfare-equivalent tariff rate, 
W
i t , is the tariff rate that results in the same loss of 
welfare as the combination of measures applied to a good. As in the case of tariffs, we take 
the welfare triangles as the measure of welfare loss.   
When the market for a good is distorted by a combination of measures that distort 
the consumer and a producer prices differentially, the welfare loss is (from equation (7))  
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This is the sum of two triangles. The two effects of the changes in consumer and producer 
prices capture all of the welfare effects when markets are competitive. The welfare-
equivalent tariff is defined by the equality 
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The welfare-equivalent tariff rate is also a weighted average of the rates of distortion of 
consumer and producer prices, the weights again being their share of the import response to 
the change in price. However, the welfare-equivalent tariff rate is the mean of order 2, not 
the arithmetic mean (which is the mean of order 1). If  0 i r >  and 0 i s >   then  0
W
i t > . 
  Because both the import-equivalent and the welfare-equivalent tariff rates are 
means of the rates of producer and consumer distortions, they lie between these two rates, 
provided the weights are positive. For the same reason, both rates are different than the 
producer-price equivalent rate. They are greater or less than this rate depending on whether 
the producer price distortion rate is less than or greater than the consumer price distortion 
rate.  
Importantly, the welfare-equivalent tariff rate is not equal to the import-equivalent 
tariff rate when the rate of distortion of the producer price is not equal to the rate of   23 
distortion of the consumer price. In fact, the welfare-equivalent tariff rate must be greater 
than the import-equivalent rate.
14
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 The difference between these two equivalent rates 
increases with the difference between the producer and the consumer distortion rate.  
  With some non-tariff measures, the rates of distortion of the producer price and the 
consumer price are equal. In these cases, the import-equivalent and the welfare-equivalent 
tariff rate are equal, and both are equal to the producer-price equivalent. This holds for 
variable levies. Quotas also fall into this category if the conditions required for equivalence 
are satisfied and if the quota is auctioned or one treats the quota rents accruing to private 
quota-holders in the same way as revenues accruing to the government under a regime of 
tariffs only. 
As one example, consider an industry that is assisted by an output-based subsidy 
alone. For the sake of illustration, we make the assumption that the slopes of the demand and 
supply functions are equal (ignoring signs). Then 
and ti
I = ½si.   
Hence, as required, the import-equivalent tariff rate is not equal to the producer-price 
equivalent tariff rate ( i s ). In fact, it is exactly one half of this rate, because the import tariff 
affects both the domestic demand and the domestic supply whereas the subsidy affects on the 
supply side of the market. On the other hand, the welfare-equivalent tariff rate is 0.71 i s  
(={0.5( i s )
2}
1/2). This rate too is less than the producer-price equivalent tariff rate, and it is 
greater than the import-equivalent tariff rate.  
As a second example, suppose a good is assisted by a combination of a 20 per cent 
tariff and a subsidy of 20 per cent in ad valorem terms. The consumer price increases by 20 
per cent and the producer price by 40 per cent. If, again, the domestic demand and supply 
curves have the same slope, the import-equivalent rate is 30 (= 0.5 0.5(0.4)) (0.2) + per 
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14 From the Theorem of the Mean, the mean of order 2 is strictly greater than the mean of order 1 if ri≠ si.   24 
where εi (< 0) are the elasticities of the import demand function in the free-trade situation 
and 
** () ii pm  are the values of imports in the free-trade situation. If the definitions of 
I
i t in 
equation (A.2) are inserted into equation (A.5), it is easily seen that the form in equation 
(A.5) is identical that in equation (4).  
  Similarly, define the WRI as  
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If the definitions of 
W
i t in equation (A.4) are inserted into equation (A.6), it is easily seen 
that the form in equation (A.6) is identical that in equation (12). 
In effect, the indexes in equations (A.5) and (A.6) are calculated in two stages.
15
                                                 
15 Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) use the expression in Equation (A.6) but again they wrongly use the 
producer price distortion in place of the welfare-equivalent tariff rate. 
  
First, we calculate the import-equivalent (welfare- equivalent) tariff rate of distortions to 
both producer and consumer prices in each market and then we average these tariff rates 
across all goods. These forms of the indexes are particularly useful if we are interested in 
the contributions which the distortions in the market for each good make to the aggregate 
loss of trade or welfare for the country. 
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Figure 1: Nominal rate of assistance to farmers in high-income and developing countries, for 
all covered farm products, 1960 to 2007 
 







 Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
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Figure 2: Consumer tax equivalents affecting covered farm products in high-income and 
developing countries, 1960 to 2007 
 






Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)   27 
Figure 3: Nominal rate of assistance to farmers in developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and in Europe’s transition economies (ECA) for covered farm products, 
1960 to 2007  
 







Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
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Figure 4: Consumer tax equivalents affecting covered farm products in developing countries 
of Africa, Asia, Latin America and in Europe’s transition economies (ECA), 1960 to 
2007 
 








Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
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Figure 5 (continued): Welfare Reduction Indexes for covered tradable farm products, by 
region, 1960 to 2007  
(percent) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).   31 
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Figure 6 (continued): Trade Reduction Indexes for covered tradable farm products, by region, 
1960 to 2007 
(percent) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 




Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).   2 
Figure 8: Trade and Welfare Reduction Indexes for covered tradable farm products, by region, 1985-89
a and 2000-04 
(percent) 
(a) Developing and transition economies 
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a The early years for ECA are 1992-94. CA is Europe’s transition economies, LAC is Latin america nad the Caribbean, NA is North 
America, EU is the 15 members of the European Union as of the start of 2004, EFTA is Iceland, Norway and Switzerland.  
Source: Derived by the authors using data from Anderson and Croser (2009) 
 
Figure 9: Country contributions to the global TRI and WRI,
a 2000–04 
(percent shares, based on US dollar values at undistorted prices)
b 
(a) TRI   4 























(b) WRI   5 























Source: Derived from data in Anderson and Croser (2009). 
 
a. The global TRI in current US dollars is multiplied by the absolute value of trade (calculated as the absolute value of the value of production 
minus the value of consumption). Each country contribution is computed as the country-level TRI multiplied by the country-level value of trade 
at undistorted prices, as a share of the global aggregate TRI multiplied by the global value of trade at undistorted prices. The global WRI in 
current US dollars is multiplied by the average of the value of global production and consumption at undistorted prices. Each country 
contribution is computed as the country-level WRI multiplied by the country-level average of the value of production and consumption at   6 
undistorted prices, as a share of the global aggregate WRI multiplied by the global average value of production and consumption at undistorted 
prices.  
b. The sum of all country contributions (which are necessarily all positive for the WRI) is 100. Country contributions of less than 1 percent are 
omitted from the figures.    7 
Figure 10: Welfare Reduction Index and real per capita GDP, all 75 countries, 1961 to 2004
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a The fitted regression line is WRI = -105 + 19.8 lnGDPPC, Adj R
2 = 0.14, n = 498 
                                                          (-5.6)    (9.1) 
 
Source: Derived by the authors using data from Anderson and Croser (2009)   8 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance,
a Africa, Asia, Latin America, European transition economies and high-income country regions, all farm 
products, 1960 to 2007       (percent) 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Covered import-competing products                   
Africa  12  4  -7  8  8  65  2  7  3  na 
Asia  4  34  26  31  21  45  28  28  35  na 
Latin America  20  3  -4  2  10  4  17  9  19  na   10 
All developing countries  11  26  17  23  17  39  22  22  28  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  31  34  34  30 
High-income countries  54  59  42  56  70  84  73  64  60  31 
World  48  50  37  46  46  66  51  43  44  na 
Covered exportables                     
Africa  -31  -39  -44  -45  -36  -36  -39  -26  -28  na 
Asia  -13  -26  -20  -25  -44  -39  -19  -4  0  na 
Latin America  -23  -17  -30  -26  -27  -24  -9  -3  -4  na 
All developing countries  -25  -29  -29  -30  -40  -37  -19  -5  -3  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  -4  -1  0  15 
High-income countries  4  10  8  7  8  17  13  6  5  3 
World  -2  -4  -7  -11  -24  -21  -8  -1  0  na 
All covered farm products
b                     
Africa  -13  -18  -22  -20  -12  1  -12  -7  -9  na 
Asia  -3  3  0  0  -21  -15  -5  6  10  na 
Latin America  -13  -13  -25  -20  -15  -14  1  1  3  na 
All developing countries  -9  -5  -9  -8  -20  -13  -5  4  7  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  7  15  15  21 
High-income countries  32  39  29  36  43  58  49  36  32  16 
World  24  24  15  18  6  16  18  16  16  na 
All agriculture
c                     
Africa  -8  -11  -15  -13  -8  -1  -9  -6  -7  na 
Asia
d  -27  -25  -25  -24  -21  -9  -2  8  12  na 
Latin America  -8  -7  -21  -18  -13  -11  4  5  5  na 
All developing countries  -23  -22  -24  -22  -18  -8  -2  6  9  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  10  18  18  25 
High-income countries  29  35  25  32  41  53  46  35  32  17 
World  22  21  13  15  8  17  18  17  18  na 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
a Weighted using the value of production at undistorted prices.  
b Includes nontradables.   
c Covered and non-covered products.  
d Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in those years were the same as the average 
NRA estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-69, and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average 
share of value of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. This NRA assumption is conservative in the sense that for both 
countries the average NRA was probably even lower in earlier years.              11 
Table 2: Consumer tax equivalents
a, Africa, Asia, Latin America, European transition economies and high-income regions, all covered farm 
products, 1960 to 2007         
(percent) 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products                     
Africa  7  0  -8  7  3  76  5  9  5  na 
Asia  1  14  8  24  24  44  32  27  35  na 
Latin America  23  11  0  8  4  1  28  11  18  na 
All developing countries  6  11  4  18  17  39  29  22  27  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  12  21  31  30 
High-income countries  53  56  41  54  65  66  57  55  50  30 
World  46  44  32  43  43  55  41  38  39  na 
Exportable products                     
Africa  -29  -36  -42  -34  -28  -31  -38  -20  -24  na 
Asia  -3  -38  -29  -32  -42  -40  -20  -5  0  na 
Latin America  -25  -14  -25  -24  -27  -21  -12  1  0  na 
All developing countries  -23  -36  -33  -30  -38  -37  -20  -5  -1  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  -6  -4  2  -1 
High-income countries  4  11  9  9  6  11  8  -2  -3  0 
World  0  -8  -9  -11  -24  -24  -11  -4  -2  na 
All covered farm products
b                     
Africa  -8  -12  -16  -9  -6  16  -8  0  -3  na 
Asia  0  -12  -15  -2  -15  -14  -3  5  10  na 
Latin America  -7  -7  -18  -13  -12  -10  13  6  8  na 
All developing countries  -5  -12  -16  -5  -14  -10  0  5  8  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  -2  9  17  11 
High-income countries  35  42  30  40  45  49  41  32  27  16 
World  28  23  14  21  10  15  16  15  16  na 
a Weighted using the value of consumption at undistorted prices. 
b Includes nontradables.  
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)   12 
Table 3: Welfare Reduction Indexes, Asian, African, Latin American, Europe’s transition economies and high-income regions
a, all covered 
tradable farm products, 1960 to 2007         
(percent) 
  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products                     
Africa  59  52  53  47  51  98  43  32  30  na 
Asia  36  45  46  50  48  62  48  44  48  na 
Latin America  54  34  27  37  47  40  46  26  32  na 
All developing countries  49  46  43  44  44  54  36  28  30  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  60  44  45  43 
High-income countries  79  87  71  100  106  123  102  91  87  50 
World  74  76  65  85  81  100  78  65  65  na 
Exportable products                     
Africa  37  44  48  49  48  55  58  41  40  na 
Asia  24  43  34  34  48  45  24  10  7  na 
Latin America  28  22  36  32  36  33  29  12  15  na 
All developing countries  31  38  38  36  46  44  26  11  10  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  37  33  31  42 
High-income countries  12  20  16  12  12  25  22  11  11  10 
World  16  27  26  24  34  39  26  13  12  na 
All covered farm tradables
                     
Africa  52  52  52  49  51  82  52  37  36  na 
Asia  27  43  39  42  47  45  28  19  16  na 
Latin America  43  25  38  36  44  39  42  20  22  na 
All developing countries  44  44  42  42  47  47  31  19  18  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  47  40  40  44 
High-income countries  49  48  46  64  69  70  51  38  37  22 
World  48  47  45  55  57  57  41  28  27  na 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production and the value of consumption at undistorted prices.    13 
Table 4: Trade Reduction Indexes, Asian, African, Latin American, Europe’s transition economies and high-income regions
a, all covered 
tradable farm products, 1960 to 2007 
(percent) 
  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products                     
Africa  -28  -23  -19  3  0  112  7  10  4  na 
Asia  11  25  19  26  38  70  68  63  76  na 
Latin America  28  27  11  2  6  1  32  11  20  na 
All developing countries  -1  20  10  11  7  48  26  10  16  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  13  23  26  29 
High-income countries  79  80  52  72  88  89  83  84  81  63 
World  64  55  42  56  58  80  59  60  62  na 
Exportable products                     
Africa  29  39  43  47  41  36  38  24  30  na 
Asia  14  27  26  23  35  20  17  8  0  na 
Latin America  20  15  28  22  23  21  5  2  3  na 
All developing countries  22  29  32  30  34  25  17  9  6  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  0  2  -2  -9 
High-income countries  -8  -12  -9  -5  -8  -21  -13  -4  -2  -2 
World  3  7  11  12  17  8  4  4  3  na 
All covered farm tradables                     
Africa  32  33  33  34  18  54  17  16  23  na 
Asia  15  28  23  28  34  28  18  8  6  na 
Latin America  22  8  19  17  19  13  23  7  8  na 
All developing countries  26  28  26  28  28  29  22  9  10  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  -4  13  14  2 
High-income countries  19  9  16  21  27  30  28  18  18  7 
World  21  17  20  24  28  30  21  14  14  na 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a Regional aggregates are weighted using the absolute value of net imports (computed as the difference between the value of consumption and 
the value of production) at undistorted prices.                 14 
Table 5: Producer Distortion Indexes (CDIs), Asian, African, Latin American, Europe’s transition economies and high-income regions
a, 
all covered farm products, 1960 to 2007  
(percent) 
  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products                     
Africa  60  54  53  48  52  93  43  32  31  na 
Asia  39  53  52  52  48  60  46  43  46  na 
Latin America  53  32  26  34  50  44  43  25  37  na 
All developing countries  51  52  48  45  45  53  33  28  31  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  58  49  48  43 
High-income countries  79  86  72  102  108  130  106  90  87  47 
                     
Exportable products                     
Africa  38  45  49  52  50  53  56  39  39  na 
Asia  24  37  29  31  49  44  24  9  7  na 
Latin America  27  22  38  33  36  34  29  13  16  na 
All developing countries  31  35  36  36  47  43  26  11  10  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  38  34  31  37 
High-income countries  11  19  16  11  12  24  19  9  10  9 
                     
All covered farm products
b                     
Africa  44  46  45  46  42  55  39  28  26  na 
Asia  32  41  37  41  48  49  32  22  20  na 
Latin America  29  24  36  34  42  39  35  18  23  na 
All developing countries  37  40  38  40  46  46  29  18  18  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  46  43  40  40 
High-income countries  53  64  53  70  74  95  76  56  53  30 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a. Regional aggregates are weighted using the value of production at undistorted process.  
b. Includes nontradables.  15 
Table 6: Consumer Distortion Indexes (CDIs), Asian, African, Latin American, Europe’s transition economies and high-income regions
a, all 
covered farm products, 1960 to 2007  
(percent) 
  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products                     
Africa  58  51  52  46  50  101  43  32  29  na 
Asia  31  32  35  48  48  62  49  44  48  na 
Latin America  55  35  27  39  43  34  45  25  24  na 
All developing countries  45  35  35  43  42  54  37  28  28  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  61  38  42  43 
High-income countries  79  86  70  98  102  114  94  88  84  50 
                     
Exportable products                     
Africa  36  43  47  45  46  58  62  42  41  na 
Asia  28  50  39  37  47  46  24  10  6  na 
Latin America  30  21  34  31  36  32  29  9  12  na 
All developing countries  33  43  40  37  45  45  26  11  9  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  36  32  30  47 
High-income countries  12  20  17  13  10  25  22  11  11  10 
                     
All covered farm products
b                     
Africa  44  43  44  39  40  62  39  27  26  na 
Asia  29  39  38  42  46  49  33  24  21  na 
Latin America  33  26  34  35  40  34  40  18  19  na 
All developing countries  37  38  38  39  43  46  31  19  17  na 
Europe’s transition economies  na  na  na  na  na  na  48  37  39  48 
High-income countries  59  70  56  76  77  91  74  62  58  36 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a. Regional aggregates are weighted using the value of consumption at undistorted prices.  
b. Includes nontradables.Table 7: Welfare Reduction Indexes, by country and region
a, all covered tradable farm 
products, 1960 to 2007 
(percent) 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  52  52  52  49  51  81  52  37  36  na 
Cameroon  29  37  42  54  38  23  20  18  11  na 
Cote d'ivoire  35  47  45  48  44  39  37  32  41  na 
Egypt  49  53  54  40  46  134  32  29  21  na 
Ethiopia  na  na  na  na  44  56  58  52  47  na 
Ghana  24  44  40  62  89  75  39  21  30  na 
Kenya  39  39  29  19  31  27  36  22  26  na 
Madagascar  26  28  26  45  58  46  30  16  15  na 
Mozambique  na  na  na  72  65  75  33  31  56  na 
Nigeria  148  129  121  105  102  127  94  75  58  na 
RSA  20  18  25  34  48  39  31  22  20  na 
Senegal  19  18  44  46  41  60  66  12  19  na 
Sudan  35  40  51  40  40  65  79  42  44  na 
Tanzania  na  na  na  71  72  68  62  54  50  na 
Uganda  11  16  44  83  58  60  11  10  10  na 
Zambia  26  38  48  59  32  70  59  40  43  na 
Zimbabwe  41  45  50  56  46  42  47  40  72  na 
                     
Asia  27  44  39  42  48  46  28  19  16  na 
Bangladesh  na  na  30  41  29  49  29  25  31  na 
China  na  na  na  na  55  48  25  12  8  na 
India  37  46  49  61  54  87  31  22  27  na 
Indonesia  na  na  18  22  31  21  24  28  27  na 
Korea  45  43  69  86  130  176  211  194  228  na 
Malaysia  14  12  10  31  57  95  71  31  34  na 
Pakistan  44  71  75  37  39  46  31  24  29  na 
Philippines  18  36  30  21  33  46  32  51  42  na 
Sri Lanka  32  28  29  37  26  29  39  35  30  na 
Taiwan  30  46  52  35  43  85  124  155  190  na 
Thailand  na  na  30  24  22  18  16  19  12  na 
Vietnam  na  na  na  na  na  22  30  24  37  na 
                     
Latin America  42  25  38  36  44  39  42  20  23  na 
Argentina  32  30  28  27  24  19  10  8  17  na 
Brazil  na  16  43  36  42  39  34  8  7  na 
Chile  53  27  28  28  16  34  23  18  13  na 
Colombia  28  23  22  26  40  25  25  35  58  na 
Dominican 
Republic  78  42  44  46  50  55  89  48  59  na 
Ecuador  na  37  48  59  71  44  20  24  32  na 
Mexico  na  na  na  43  48  42  54  30  33  na 
Nicaragua  na  na  na  na  na  na  29  31  26  na 
                     
All developing 
countries  44  44  42  42  48  48  32  19  18  na 
Continued over 
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Table 7: (cont)                 
 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Europe’s 
transition econs.  na  na  na  na  na  na  47  40  40  45 
Bulgaria  na  na  na  na  na  na  28  26  22  29 
Czech Rep  na  na  na  na  na  na  39  30  40  33 
Estonia  na  na  na  na  na  na  28  27  31  31 
Hungary  na  na  na  na  na  na  35  34  52  31 
Latvia  na  na  na  na  na  na  54  47  67  31 
Lithuania  na  na  na  na  na  na  54  52  68  31 
Poland  na  na  na  na  na  na  27  27  38  33 
Romania  na  na  na  na  na  na  36  44  65  51 
Russia  na  na  na  na  na  na  46  34  33  na 
Slovakia  na  na  na  na  na  na  31  30  39  32 
Slovenia  na  na  na  na  na  na  60  72  71  45 
Turkey  21  36  35  41  38  38  50  58  50  59 
Ukraine  na  na  na  na  na  na  39  33  25  na 
                     
High-income 
countries  49  48  46  64  69  71  52  38  38  22 
Australia  20  31  28  18  13  21  21  9  4  2 
Austria  92  93  39  43  39  82  106  60  56  33 
Canada  16  15  15  50  81  90  59  37  42  35 
Denmark  82  84  93  157  139  121  71  55  50  26 
Finland  129  138  108  129  69  204  204  65  58  31 
France  93  118  94  118  124  115  74  55  51  32 
Germany  142  146  109  133  134  117  73  58  52  28 
Iceland  na  na  na  188  193  365  299  201  180  194 
Ireland  66  99  97  187  179  169  93  74  69  44 
Italy  89  90  73  88  99  93  63  49  47  23 
Japan  74  94  106  155  150  248  240  210  213  163 
Netherlands  137  159  129  170  164  132  76  64  56  33 
New Zealand  11  12  14  20  24  28  13  10  9  7 
Norway  286  289  289  280  222  256  229  174  164  117 
Portugal  22  29  31  57  30  70  56  43  42  30 
Spain  35  53  29  38  40  80  59  44  41  27 
Sweden  149  184  137  204  163  139  122  64  61  35 
Switzerland  269  263  256  242  173  344  284  195  172  108 
UK  147  142  115  140  135  128  81  62  58  37 
US  13  20  12  12  26  35  22  19  25  16 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008). 
a. Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production and the 
value of consumption at undistorted prices.    3 
Table 8: Trade Reduction Indexes, by country and region
a, all covered tradable farm 
products, 1960 to 2007 
(percent) 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  32  33  33  34  18  54  17  16  22  na 
Cameroon  27  34  38  49  35  9  8  8  3  na 
Cote d'ivoire  17  16  37  50  28  31  27  27  39  na 
Egypt  -5  2  -2  15  8  95  12  17  6  na 
Ethiopia  na  na  na  na  41  54  56  49  36  na 
Ghana  3  13  18  42  59  66  32  11  25  na 
Kenya  -27  -21  -6  -3  -7  25  -9  10  12  na 
Madagascar  21  17  -15  7  -1  29  10  6  11  na 
Mozambique  na  na  na  31  -6  -16  3  19  44  na 
Nigeria  112  102  94  64  50  78  25  17  -7  na 
RSA  1  4  9  2  4  -14  -9  -1  -2  na 
Senegal  19  13  38  45  35  36  36  8  16  na 
Sudan  29  28  29  29  23  56  40  18  31  na 
Tanzania  na  na  na  24  22  42  41  22  30  na 
Uganda  8  14  38  85  59  61  10  7  6  na 
Zambia  21  1  1  36  -12  -46  -28  -7  29  na 
Zimbabwe  35  39  43  51  29  37  19  10  12  na 
                     
Asia  15  28  23  28  34  28  18  8  6  na 
Banglasdesh  na  na  -13  9  -1  24  1  -8  6  na 
China  na  na  na  na  44  44  19  4  1  na 
India  21  36  42  47  38  70  26  18  22  na 
Indonesia  na  na  1  9  14  5  2  -1  19  na 
Korea  5  16  44  69  119  158  189  164  184  na 
Malaysia  12  4  8  19  18  21  14  5  5  na 
Pakistan  7  42  19  3  4  12  -3  -2  4  na 
Philippines  -4  2  1  0  3  16  18  39  27  na 
Sri Lanka  26  17  20  20  13  5  23  17  4  na 
Taiwan  -6  -3  -16  -8  -19  -25  37  67  96  na 
Thailand  na  na  25  19  13  11  9  6  1  na 
Vietnam  na  na  na  na  na  12  28  6  -11  na 
                     
Latin America  22  8  19  17  19  13  23  7  8  na 
Argentina  30  27  28  25  23  18  7  3  13  na 
Brazil  na  12  28  19  20  13  11  0  0  na 
Chile  9  -7  -15  4  8  24  17  14  8  na 
Colombia  14  5  8  8  18  11  5  12  -13  na 
Dominican 
Republic  60  25  21  27  37  34  57  30  37  na 
Ecuador  na  12  15  34  45  26  3  7  16  na 
Mexico  na  na  na  12  16  13  26  8  17  na 
Nicaragua  na  na  na  na  na  na  11  22  18  na 
                     
All developing 
countries  26  27  27  28  28  29  21  9  10  na 
Continued over 
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Table 8: (cont)                 
 
   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Europe’s 
transition econs.  na  na  na  na  na  na  -4  13  14  2 
Bulgaria  na  na  na  na  na  na  11  10  6  12 
Czech Rep  na  na  na  na  na  na  -20  1  12  1 
Estonia  na  na  na  na  na  na  2  16  2  6 
Hungary  na  na  na  na  na  na  -6  -12  -19  -12 
Latvia  na  na  na  na  na  na  32  22  20  11 
Lithuania  na  na  na  na  na  na  36  14  -5  -3 
Poland  na  na  na  na  na  na  15  7  -8  -17 
Romania  na  na  na  na  na  na  8  20  41  31 
Russia  na  na  na  na  na  na  -31  16  22  na 
Slovakia  na  na  na  na  na  na  -2  7  4  0 
Slovenia  na  na  na  na  na  na  -8  -17  -21  -12 
Turkey  4  3  10  22  9  13  16  23  17  8 
Ukraine  na  na  na  na  na  na  20  11  14  na 
                     
High-income 
countries  19  9  16  21  27  28  28  18  18  7 
Australia  -7  -11  -6  -3  -4  -7  -7  -3  -1  0 
Austria  69  66  19  24  23  -22  -11  41  38  17 
Canada  8  6  6  15  22  25  22  13  14  14 
Denmark  -35  -35  -3  61  70  75  51  37  32  12 
Finland  39  17  -7  -10  18  -106  -153  50  41  16 
France  58  73  44  47  69  72  51  32  29  13 
Germany  98  112  66  64  81  73  52  39  33  14 
Iceland  na  na  na  130  151  -33  10  35  38  45 
Ireland  -4  -12  7  96  117  128  81  63  55  26 
Italy  45  48  33  34  52  49  31  25  23  8 
Japan  64  73  73  102  105  144  134  132  127  106 
Netherlands  89  120  86  96  110  84  55  48  40  17 
New Zealand  2  2  2  -8  -11  -1  2  2  1  0 
Norway  272  276  275  243  -15  155  195  155  140  88 
Portugal  10  15  13  32  20  33  24  21  21  12 
Spain  21  18  -1  -2  3  42  30  23  21  11 
Sweden  46  41  42  51  49  -71  -59  47  42  18 
Switzerland  82  86  96  107  154  81  44  17  14  37 
UK  70  49  36  64  82  89  65  44  39  22 
US  4  2  1  4  7  7  6  2  4  1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008). 
a.  Regional aggregates are weighted using the absolute value of net imports (computed 
as the difference between the value of consumption and the value of production) at 
undistorted prices.    5 
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Africa  56  58  59  61  62  75  56  43  37  na 
Cameroon  29  40  44  57  40  22  23  22  11  na 
Cote d'Ivoire  45  50  48  59  59  45  46  38  45  na 
Egypt  50  55  56  40  45  127  31  29  23  na 
Ethiopia  na  na  na  na  35  47  49  41  25  na 
Ghana  25  54  47  76  87  67  38  25  27  na 
Kenya  30  29  28  14  27  20  34  18  16  na 
Madagascar  28  29  28  51  63  52  38  18  17  na 
Mozambique  na  na  na  75  69  77  37  30  46  na 
Nigeria  133  118  112  100  101  125  93  74  58  na 
RSA  20  19  25  33  49  40  32  21  21  na 
Senegal  20  17  44  47  44  45  50  14  20  na 
Sudan  40  44  53  44  43  66  78  44  45  na 
Tanzania  na  na  na  73  74  71  64  55  51  na 
Uganda  11  18  47  90  66  65  12  8  9  na 
Zambia  25  37  46  59  32  70  59  41  45  na 
Zimbabwe  42  42  50  56  49  45  47  40  75  na 
                      Asia  33  48  48  47  51  56  32  22  20  na 
Bangladesh  na  na  30  41  29  49  29  25  30  na 
China  na  na  na  na  58  48  25  11  7  na 
India  51  50  55  61  54  89  30  19  28  na 
Indonesia  na  na  18  23  31  21  23  28  27  na 
Korea  46  45  75  90  133  185  224  212  257  na 
Malaysia  13  11  14  25  29  34  32  15  16  na 
Pakistan  46  71  73  36  38  45  30  24  29  na 
Philippines  19  41  30  21  35  46  32  50  41  na 
Sri Lanka  38  36  34  42  29  29  37  30  24  na 
Taiwan  30  47  53  35  42  85  124  157  195  na 
Thailand  na  na  29  24  21  18  17  18  11  na 
Vietnam  na  na  na  na  na  22  30  22  35  na 
                      Latin America  32  25  37  34  42  39  35  18  23  na 
Argentina  32  29  29  27  24  20  11  10  19  na 
Brazil  na  12  46  36  42  40  34  8  7  na 
Chile  54  26  27  26  13  31  21  17  12  na 
Colombia  23  24  23  28  37  24  23  33  55  na 
Dominican Republic  59  38  42  47  51  57  83  43  56  na 
Ecuador  na  35  47  56  65  40  19  23  30  na 
Mexico  na  na  na  46  54  49  56  31  38  na 
Nicaragua  na  na  na  na  na  na  29  35  27  na 
                     
Developing countries  46  48  48  47  50  53  32  20  20  na 
Continued over 
                     
                     























econs.  18  37  35  41  39  40  46  43  40  40 
Bulgaria  na  na  na  na  na  na  25  26  22  28 
Czech Republic  na  na  na  na  na  na  33  32  40  28 
Estonia  na  na  na  na  na  na  28  27  32  24 
Hungary  na  na  na  na  na  na  35  34  48  23 
Latvia  na  na  na  na  na  na  52  45  64  24 
Lithuania  na  na  na  na  na  na  54  52  70  29 
Poland  na  na  na  na  na  na  26  30  34  29 
Romania  na  na  na  na  na  na  37  45  70  52 
Russia  na  na  na  na  na  na  38  38  34  na 
Slovakia  na  na  na  na  na  na  34  33  41  25 
Slovenia  na  na  na  na  na  na  68  80  82  38 
Turkey  23  37  35  41  39  40  51  61  50  56 
Ukraine  na  na  na  na  na  na  43  36  27  na 
                     
High-income countries
b  53  64  53  70  74  95  76  56  54  31 
Australia  16  23  21  14  11  12  9  7  0  0 
Austria  77  85  37  43  40  73  102  62  59  33 
Canada  15  14  14  46  75  81  56  35  39  32 
Denmark  72  81  86  139  131  124  75  55  48  23 
Finland  126  134  107  129  70  170  175  68  58  28 
France  92  117  92  116  120  124  83  57  53  29 
Germany  147  150  112  137  139  131  83  63  57  29 
Iceland  na  na  na  260  258  382  319  217  188  212 
Ireland  75  106  102  164  172  178  99  81  79  49 
Italy  89  90  73  88  97  98  66  49  46  21 
Japan  77  101  113  164  160  263  261  228  236  181 
Netherlands  136  161  131  168  162  133  76  65  58  31 
New Zealand  9  10  12  19  25  24  10  8  7  5 
Norway  276  281  287  299  298  337  291  207  188  127 
Portugal  21  26  29  56  28  71  56  42  40  26 
Spain  34  50  28  37  41  88  64  46  42  25 
Sweden  173  185  150  196  160  126  116  66  60  30 
Switzerland  261  258  252  249  220  405  325  223  183  108 
UK  153  145  120  143  134  139  89  63  57  37 
US  12  19  12  11  25  36  24  17  26  17 
                     
                      World  51  58  51  60  61  71  53  37  35  na 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008).   7 
Appendix Table 2: Consumer Distortion Indexes, Asian, African, Latin American, 
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   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Africa  64  62  63  60  62  88  58  46  41  na 
Cameroon  28  34  39  51  37  24  15  12  9  na 
Cote d'Ivoire  30  44  42  45  34  36  29  26  37  na 
Egypt  49  51  53  38  45  139  33  30  20  na 
Ethiopia  na  na  na  na  52  65  66  62  61  na 
Ghana  24  31  31  37  85  79  35  16  32  na 
Kenya  43  50  27  29  23  51  35  34  39  na 
Madagascar  20  28  25  40  54  40  23  14  13  na 
Mozambique  na  na  na  70  63  74  30  33  70  na 
Nigeria  163  140  128  108  102  128  94  74  57  na 
RSA  20  17  25  34  47  38  30  21  20  na 
Senegal  19  18  43  45  37  72  78  11  17  na 
Sudan  32  37  48  37  37  64  80  40  43  na 
Tanzania  na  na  na  70  70  65  60  54  50  na 
Uganda  10  15  41  80  53  58  11  11  11  na 
Zambia  27  46  50  57  31  69  60  38  40  na 
Zimbabwe  40  47  49  56  43  40  45  40  68  na 
                      Asia  29  40  40  48  49  57  34  24  23  na 
Bangladesh  na  na  30  42  29  48  29  25  32  na 
China  na  na  na  na  52  48  25  12  9  na 
India  10  39  41  61  53  84  31  24  25  na 
Indonesia  na  na  19  20  30  21  23  28  28  na 
Korea  44  42  62  82  127  166  197  174  195  na 
Malaysia  12  8  8  22  21  34  20  9  8  na 
Pakistan  43  71  78  39  40  47  31  25  31  na 
Philippines  18  32  30  21  32  46  32  51  42  na 
Sri Lanka  28  23  25  34  23  29  40  41  36  na 
Taiwan  30  46  50  36  45  86  123  153  185  na 
Thailand  na  na  30  25  24  17  16  20  14  na 
Vietnam  na  na  na  na  na  22  30  26  39  na 
                      Latin 
America  38  26  34  35  40  34  40  18  19  na 
Argentina  33  30  28  27  25  18  9  4  15  na 
Brazil  na  19  41  37  42  38  34  7  6  na 
Chile  51  27  28  30  18  37  26  20  15  na 
Colombia  33  24  21  26  44  28  27  36  57  na 
Dominican 
Rep  104  45  43  42  49  53  95  52  61  na 
Ecuador  na  39  49  60  76  45  20  24  33  na 
Mexico  na  na  na  39  41  32  49  29  23  na 
Nicaragua  na  na  na  na  na  na  30  29  27  na 
                      Developing 
countries  49  43  43  47  48  55  34  22  20  na 
Continued over 
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   1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Europe’s 
transition 
econs.  15  36  36  42  38  36  48  37  39  48 
Bulgaria  na  na  na  na  na  na  30  26  23  32 
Czech Rep  na  na  na  na  na  na  41  28  41  29 
Estonia  na  na  na  na  na  na  27  25  29  26 
Hungary  na  na  na  na  na  na  35  33  55  25 
Latvia  na  na  na  na  na  na  58  49  70  32 
Lithuania  na  na  na  na  na  na  54  52  66  32 
Poland  na  na  na  na  na  na  28  25  39  32 
Romania  na  na  na  na  na  na  33  42  59  51 
Russia  na  na  na  na  na  na  54  28  32  na 
Slovakia  na  na  na  na  na  na  27  27  36  26 
Slovenia  na  na  na  na  na  na  54  65  58  34 
Turkey  19  36  36  42  38  36  48  54  50  62 
Ukraine  na  na  na  na  na  na  34  30  22  na 
                      High-income 
countries
b  59  70  56  76  77  91  74  62  58  36 
Australia  23  37  35  24  16  26  27  10  6  2 
Austria  104  99  40  42  37  88  111  57  53  30 
Canada  17  15  15  52  85  97  59  38  45  38 
Denmark  84  83  94  166  140  116  66  55  50  24 
Finland  133  141  108  129  68  225  225  62  57  29 
France  93  119  97  120  128  106  65  52  50  30 
Germany  137  141  106  128  130  102  61  53  48  26 
Iceland  na  na  na  56  86  323  257  146  124  141 
Ireland  61  98  94  206  184  160  86  67  58  30 
Italy  88  89  72  88  101  86  56  49  48  23 
Japan  72  86  98  144  140  231  216  189  188  141 
Netherlands  137  158  126  172  166  131  75  62  55  28 
New Zealand  14  14  16  21  23  33  18  13  12  9 
Norway  295  298  290  248  97  124  141  131  135  107 
Portugal  24  32  33  59  31  67  53  44  44  29 
Spain  36  56  29  38  39  68  51  42  40  25 
Sweden  139  183  130  210  165  149  124  62  62  34 
Switzerland  280  270  262  232  106  275  239  164  162  108 
UK  139  139  111  136  136  117  73  60  58  39 
US  14  22  12  12  26  34  20  20  24  17 
                     
                      World  56  60  52  64  61  71  53  40  38  na 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008).   9 
Appendix Table 3: Country shares of the average of global value of production and value of 






(a) of the global average of value of 
production and value of consumption, at 
undistorted prices in current $US 
 Country  Share  
China  24.3 
US  14.6 
India  6.1 
Japan  4.5 
France  3.4 
Brazil  3.2 
Germany  3.0 
Mexico  2.9 
Indonesia  2.8 
Italy  2.6 
Russia  2.5 
Spain  2.3 
Turkey  2.1 
Australia  1.7 
Canada  1.7 
UK  1.6 
Argentina  1.4 
Philippines  1.1 
Ukraine  1.0 
Sudan  1.0 
Korea  1.0 
Pakistan  1.0 
Egypt  1.0 
Poland  0.9 
Netherlands  0.8 
Thailand  0.8 
New Zealand  0.7 
Bangladesh  0.7 
Rep South Africa  0.7 
Romania  0.6 
Vietnam  0.6 
Nigeria  0.5 
Colombia  0.5 
 
Continued over 
   
   
(b) Share of the global absolute value of 
trade, at undistorted prices in current $US 
 
 Country  Share 
Japan  18.3 
Australia  8.0 
Brazil  5.6 
Mexico  5.1 
Thailand  4.5 
Korea  4.4 
Malaysia  4.2 
Argentina  4.0 
Canada  3.4 
France  3.0 
Russia  2.8 
New Zealand  2.5 
UK  2.5 
China  2.4 
US  2.2 
Germany  1.9 
Denmark  1.6 
Egypt  1.5 
Cote d’Ivoire  1.4 
Vietnam  1.3 
Poland  1.3 
Ukraine  1.3 
Sudan  1.2 
Indonesia  1.2 
Netherlands  1.1 
Romania  1.0 
India  0.9 
Kazakhstan  0.9 
Ireland  0.6 
Portugal  0.6 
Zimbabwe  0.6 
Ecuador  0.5 
Italy  0.5 
 
Continued over 
   
     10 
 Country  Share  
Denmark  0.5 
Portugal  0.4 
Malaysia  0.4 
Kazakhstan  0.4 
Hungary  0.3 
Austria  0.3 
Ireland  0.3 
Sweden  0.3 
Czech Rep  0.3 
Ecuador  0.3 
Switzerland  0.2 
Chile  0.2 
Taiwan  0.2 
Bulgaria  0.2 
Finland  0.2 
Cote d’Ivoire  0.2 
Tanzania  0.1 
Kenya  0.1 
Sri Lanka  0.1 
Zimbabwe  0.1 
Nicaragua  0.1 
Norway  0.1 
Slovakia  0.1 
Lithuania  0.1 
Ethiopia  0.1 
Madagascar  0.1 
Ghana  0.1 
Dominican Rep  0.1 
Uganda  0.1 
Zambia  0.1 
Senegal  0.1 
Latvia  0.1 
Slovenia  0.0 
Mozambique  0.0 
Estonia  0.0 
Cameroon  0.0 
Iceland  0.0 
Mali  0.0 
Burkina Faso  0.0 
Benin  0.0 
Togo  0.0 
Chad  0.0 




 Country  Share 
Spain  0.5 
Switzerland  0.5 
Sweden  0.4 
Nicaragua  0.4 
Kenya  0.4 
Hungary  0.4 
Colombia  0.3 
Sri Lanka  0.3 
Ghana  0.3 
Pakistan  0.3 
Bangladesh  0.3 
Turkey  0.3 
Norway  0.3 
Senegal  0.2 
Philippines  0.2 
Cameroon  0.2 
Zambia  0.2 
Taiwan  0.2 
Nigeria  0.2 
Tanzania  0.2 
Czech Rep  0.2 
Chile  0.2 
Bulgaria  0.1 
Ethiopia  0.1 
Rep South Africa  0.1 
Mozambique  0.1 
Slovenia  0.1 
Latvia  0.1 
Dominican Rep  0.1 
Madagascar  0.1 
Mali  0.1 
Burkina Faso  0.1 
Estonia  0.1 
Slovakia  0.1 
Benin  0.1 
Finland  0.0 
Austria  0.0 
Iceland  0.0 
Lithuania  0.0 
Uganda  0.0 
Togo  0.0 
Chad  0.0 
Sum  100.0 
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